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ON THE DYNAMICS 
OF PRIVATIZATION 
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ABSTRACT: In this paper, we answer two questions about how privatization should proceed. First, we 
assume an exogenously given time span of privatization and study how the rate of privatization is related 
to the initial total state capital, the adjustment cost of privatization, the efficiency difference between the 
private sector and the state sector. the income discount rate and the exogenous terminal time fur privatiza­
tion. Second, from the perspective of income maximization and adjustment cost minimization, we endog­
enize the choice of the time span of privatization and offer a solution to the optimal terminal time for the 
completion of the privatization process. JEL Classification Numbers: El, 02,P2, PS. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is generally agreed that the most difficult task in transforming Central and Eastern Euro­
pean economies into market economies is the privatization of the state sector. While price 
libralization and currency convertibility may be achieved through the "shock therapy" or 
"big bang," the process of privatization may last for years (Lipton & Sachs, 1990a, b) or 
even decades (Kornai, 1990). The experience of privatization up  to date in East Europe 
has shown a mix of the one-by-one (the gradualist or British-style privatization) approach 
and the systemic (the mass privatization) approach (Sachs, 1992), and, for most countries, 
the privatization processes seem to continue for many years to come. 
It goes without saying that, in any former socialist state, the speed of privatization and 
the time span of privatization are determined by many factors other than purely economic 
considerations  because  privatization  is  not only  necessary  for  economic efficiency, it is 
also a precondition for fundamental social and political changes. In this paper, we will limit 
our attention to the economic rationals for privatization and answer two questions about 
how privatization should proceed.  First,  we assume an exogenously given time span of 
privatization and study how the rate of privatization is related to the initial total state capi­
tal, the adjustment cost of privatization, the efficiency difference between the private sector 
and the state sector, the income discount rate and the exogenous terminal.time for privati­
zation. Second, from the perspective of income maximization and adjustment cost minimi­
zation, we endogenize the choice of the time span  of privatization and offer a solution to 
the optimal terminal time for the completion of the privatization process. We will deal with 
the first problem in the second section and the second problem in the third section. Conclu­
sions and extensions will be presented in the fourth section. 
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THE BASIC DYNAMICS 
We consider a typical socialist economy at the beginning of transition. The aggregate cap­
ital stock in this economy is given by k, which consists of two parts: a dominant state sec­
tor k8 and a relatively small share of private capital kp: 
{1) 
The income generated in the state sector is: 
(3) 
and the income generated in the private sector is: 
(4) 
In general, the private sector in a competitive environment is more efficient than the state 
sector. This is the most important reason why there should be privatization in this economy. 
The  efficiency  discrepancy between the private and state  ownership  can  be most  easily 
characterized by two simple, linear versions of the income functions: 
(3') 
(4') 
where 9;'s (i, =sand p) are all positive, but 
(5) 
This formulation of a  linear technology  in the capital stock has been quite popular in 
recent theory of endogenous growth, in particular, see Barro (1990) and Rebelo (1991). It 
can be justified in two ways. First, the capital stock can be understood to include both phys­
ical and human capital. In our case, the privatization process not only transforms the state 
capital stock to the private sector, it also involves the reallocation of workers (human cap­
ital) through firing, unemployment, retraining, and rehiring. With this broad definition of 
capital, the usual neoclassical production function with capital and labor as separate inputs 
can be approximated by the linear technologies in (3') and (4'). Second, following Barro 
(  1990), we can also think that capital and labor enter the production process in certain fixed 
proportion as in the Leontief technology. Then a Cobb-Douglas production function can be 
simplified to be a linear function of the capital stock. 
The transformation  of state capital into private  capital involves the cost of adjustment 
such as the overhaul  and reorganization of the existing  production method and manage-ON THE DYNAMICS OF PRWATIZATION  223 
ment system.  If we interpret the capital stock in  the broad sense above, the privatization 
process involves reallocation of both physical capital and human capital. In this way,  the 
adjustment cost  or  the privatization cost also  includes the cost of unemployment,  social 
safety  net, and retraining. Following the usual assumption in the text-version investment 
theory  such  as  Blanchard  and  Fischer  (1989),  the  adjustment  cost  for  investment  is 
assumed  to  be  increasing  and  convex  in  the  new  investment  in  the  private  sector.  Let 
h  (kp) denote the adjustment  cost. The function h(.)is assumed to be quadratic: 
(7) 
wherek
p  is the incremental investment in the private sector or the rate of privatization. By 
equation (1), given the total capital in this economy, an increase in private capital comes 
from an equal amount of reduction in the state sector: 
(8) 
This  economy  intends  to  maximizes  its  net  discounted  income.  In  this  section,  we 
first  consider  the case  where  the time  span  of  privatization,  from  now  (time  zero)  to a 
future time T, is determined exogenously. That is to say, the choice of time span of priva­
tization [Q, TJ is not our concern and, by time T, kP'<n will account for all existing capi­
tal stock k. 
(9) 
If part of the existing capital stock is still owned by the state at time T, we can just write 
kp(T) = ell and 0 < a < 1. But in this paper, for notational simplicity, we will assume a total 
privatization of the state sector, namely, a = 1 by time T. 
Since our focus is the privatization of the state sector, we ignore the part of private capi­
tal formation through new investment other than the privatized state capital. With this sim­
plification, the net income during the period of privatization is: 
and the net  income after the completion of privatization is produced, by our assumption, 
only in the private sector: 
y  =  9/ fort> T. 
Then, the economy's objective function can be formulated as to: 
(10) 224 
subject to: 
CHINA  ECONOMIC REVIEW  VOLUME 5(2)  1994 
k  =  k
s 
+ kp  (1) 
kp  =  -ks  (8) 
kP(D  =  k  (9) 
kP 
(O)  =  kpo·  (11) 
here  r (> 0) is the income discount rate and  Tis given. The term (6�e-rT/r) represents a 
kind of  "salvage value" because it is the discounted income generated in the private sector 
from time  Ton.  Since we exclude the possibility of new private investment other  than  the 
privatiza!_i on  of  the  existing  state capital stock, we  have  to maintain the condition that 
k  (t)  � k for all  tin the interval  [0, T]. In addition, we  might  as well impose the assump­
ti� n of irreversibility in the investment process of the private sector, namely, kp  ( t)  ;::: 0. 
Substituting equations  (1), (2) and  (8) into (10),  we have: 
subject to: 
and  Tis given. 
The  Euler equation for this problem is: 
namely, 
-rt  -rt  · 
dye  ldkP 




In equation (13),  we make the change of variable  kp  =  z. so that  kp  =  i.  Then equation 
(13) can be written as a  first-order differential equation: 
Its solution is: ON THE DYNAMICS OF PRNATIZATION 
where c  1 is a constant of integration. Integration again yields: 
where c2  is another constant of integration. The boundary conditions: 
yield values for the constants of integration: 
Therefore the optimal time path for capital formation in the private sector is: 
- rT  (8p-es)tlry+kpo+ {[(k-kP0)rl(e  -1)] 
rT  rT 




Since  kp(t)  = k-ks(t),  equation (15)  also describes the divestiture of the state sector. 
Differentiating kp(t) with respect to time  tin equation (15): 
(16) 
Equation (16)  is the optimal dynamic path for the private sector investment or the rate of 
privatization, which has the following properties: 
Proposition 1:  If (rn >  (rTP  for  0 < t < T, the privatization rate is positively related to 
the efficiency difference between the private-sector capital and the state-sector capital; if 
(rn < (rn2  for  0 < t < T, the privatization rate  is negatively related to the efficiency dif­
ference. 
Proof 
rt  rT 
=  1/ (ry)-Te  /( e  -l)y 
rT  rt  rT 
=  (e  -1-rTe  )/ (e  -l)ry. 226  CHINA ECONOMIC  REVIEW  VOLUME 5(2)  1994 
The denominator is always positive as ert is always larger than one and rT  > 0. But the 
sign of the numerator is ambiguous. To see this, note that erT 
= 1  + rT + (rT)2!2!  + ...  , erT = 
1  + rt+ (rt)212!  + ...  ;thus erT -1-rTert =  (rTl/2!- rT(rT)2!2!  + (rT)3!3!-r(rT)3!3!  + .... 
This expression is positive if (rT) >  (rT)2, and it is negative if (rT  < (rt)2. Let us illustrate 
this proposition with the following example. Suppose that the income discount rate, r, is 12 
percent. If the privatization process is required to finish in 15 years or T=  15, then rT i s 1.5. 
Then, when  tis less than 10.351 years, the privatization rate is positively related to the effi­
ciency difference ap- as; but when t  >  10.351, (rt)2 is greater than 1.5 and the privatization 
rate changes its direction with respect to the efficiency difference (9p-9s). 
From intuition, it seems that, if the private sector is much more efficient than the state 
sector, the privatization should proceed faster during the period of [0, 1]. But Proposition 
1 only partly confirms this conjecture. In particular, if the time discount rate is large and the 
period of privatization  lasts long (namely, a large T), it is likely  that the pace of privatiza­
tion will slow down as t gradually approaches T. Thus Proposition 1 provides some useful 
information on the time path of the privatization rate during the period [0, 1]. At the begin­
ning of the privatization process, as t is much smaller than T  and  the privatization rate is 
positively linked to the efficiency deference between the private sector and the state sector. 
With time going,  tis increasing and, after t reaches certain value, (rt)2 can be greater than 
the value rT, the privatization rate will be inversely related to the efficiency difference (9p 
-98). 
Proposition 2:  If (rT)  >  (rT)2 for 0 < t < T, the privatization rate is a decreasing func­
tion of the adjustment cost y; if (rT)  <  (rT)2 for 0 < t < T,  the privatization rate  is an 
increasing function of the adjustment cost. 
The proof follows Proposition 1 because we have: 
·  rT  rT  rT  2  dkp(t)ldy  = -(9P-98) (e  -1-rTe  )l(e  -1) ry . 
In the expression above, since (9p- 9s) is positive, the numerator will be negative if (rT) 
> (rT)2 for 0 < t < T. In this case, a high adjustment cost will lower the privatization rate. 
Since this case fits more to the initial stage of the transformation process, this proposition 
seems to suggest that the initial privatization should proceed slowly if the adjustment cost 
or the privatization cost is very high. But, when (rT) < (rT)2 for 0 < t < T, privatization will 
have progressed for a time and the adjustment cost, discounted at  the rate r,  will become 
small and, accordingly, the pace of privatization will be speeded up. 
Proposition 3:  The  larger the  initial  state capital stock ks0(=  k - kp0),  the faster the 
privatization rate: 
·  - rt  rT 
dkp(t)l d(k-kp0) =re  l(e  -1)>0. 
This proposition is what we have expected. If most of the capital is in the hand of the 
state, the time limit set exogenously will exert pressure upon the privatization process and ON THE DYNAMICS OF PRIVATIZATION  227 
the privatization rate will be increasing. At the same time, the discounted efficiency gain is 
also large when the inefficiency of the state ownership is got rid of quickly. On the other 
hand, when the existing private sector in the economy is already very significant, the time 
horizon of privatization, [0, 1], does not demand fast speed of privatization and it is better 
for the economy to get privatized slowly. This proposition applies quite well to the case of 
Hungary  and China, where, at the initial stage of transformation, private ownership and 
market elements are significant compared to countries like Poland and Russia, and, thus, 
the privatization process has taken place at a relatively slower pace. 
Proposition 4:  An increase in the the time span of privatization is likely to reduce the 
privatization rate. 
Proof" 
r(t+ T)  rT  2 
dkP(t)ldT  = -[(k-kp0)re  l(e  -1)]  y 
-<e  p 
rt  rt  rT  rT  2 
9s)e  (e  -l-rTe  )lr(e  -1). 
In the expression above, the first term on the right hand side is always negative as  (k  -
kp0)  is positive; the second term is negative or positive depending on the condition whether 
(r1) is greater or smaller than  (r1)2 for 0 < t < T. But we should note the value of er(t  + 1) in 
the first term will be much larger than the value of ert  in the second term, and the negative 
effect of an increase in T seems to dominate. That is to say, a lengthening of the time span 
of privatization is likely to slow down the privatization rate. The intuition also supports this 
conclusion. For a given amount of state capital stock, more time available for the privati­
zation process can only reduce or at most does not affect the rate of privatization. 
Proposition 5:  If (k- kp  0)ry >  (9p  -_es)T, the privatization rate accelerates during the 
time span [0, 1]; on the other hand, if (k-kp  0)ry<  (9p-es)T. the privatization rate decel­
erates from time zero to T. 
Proof" 
·  - rT  rT  rt  dkp(t)ldt=  {[(k-kP0)rl(e  -l)]-[(ep-e)TI(e  -l)y]}re. 
The term in the braces is positive if (k-kpO)r"(>  (ep-es)T, and it is negative if (k-kpO)r"f 
<  (ep-es)T. If the term in the braces is positive, the privatization rate will rise with time. 
If the term is negative, the private investment rate or the rate of privatization will keep 
decreasing. 
The condition whether (k-kp0)ry  >  (9p-es)T or (k-kp0)ry  <  (9p-es)T leads us to study 
the requirements for an accelerating privatization process and a decelerating privatization 
process. If the initial state capital stock, ks0 =  (k-kp0), is large, if the income discount rate, 
r, is large, and if the adjustment cost, y, is also large, then privatization will become faster 
and faster during [0, 1]. On the other hand, if the efficiency difference  (9p-es)  is very sig­
nificant and the terminal time Tis remote from today, the privatization rate will be decreas­
ing from the present to T. 228  CHINA ECONOMIC  REVIEW  VOLUME 5(2)  1994 
To understand this proposition, we offer some economic intuition here. For the acceler­
ating case, the driving forces are high adjustment cost, high income discount rate, and very 
small initial private capital stock compared to the total capital stock or a large initial state 
capital stock. Since the income discount rate and the adjustment cost are high, it is advan­
tageous to privatize at a small scale initially and then to gradually increase the scale. This 
is  reasonable because a high income discount rate often leads to the preference of the sta­
tus quo over the future  while the  discounted  future  income  and  cost  appear to be worth 
much less than the present ones. So with a high income discount rate, the privatization will 
be  accelerated  throughout  the  time  span  [0.  T].  In addition,  the  accelerating  process  is 
likely to happen if the efficiency  difference between the private sector and the state sector 
is  small.  This  is  well justified  because  rapid  privatization  at  the  beginning  brings  about 
small efficiency gain but large adjustment cost; thus it is worthwhile to postpone the large 
scale privatization and the discounted adjustment cost will become small. On the contrary, 
if the efficiency difference is great and if the gain from privatization  outweighs the adjust­
ment cost today, the economy should privatize at large scale today and in the near future. 
For the role of  the terminal time for privatization, T, a small T naturally  speeds up  thep­
rivatization  process  while  a  large  T provides  plenty  of time  for  gradualist  approach  to 
privatization. 
THE CHOICE OF THE TIME SPAN OF PRIVATIZATION 
Should privatization be proceeded gradually or in a "big-bang"? Our model in the last sec­
tion totally avoided this problem by assuming an exogenously determined terminal time 
for privatization, T. But,  by focusing on the problem of income maximization or adjust­
ment cost minimization,  our model can shed light on this problem. Of course, what has 
happened in practice is far more complex than our model specified in this paper. Political 
and social  adjustments  are often  closely  linked  to privatization, and they  often demand 
rapid privatization to facilitate political and social transitions from communist dictatorship 
to democracy because state ownership is the economic foundation of communist dictator­
ship. Furthermore, the success of economic transition as a whole depends on the speed of 
privatization. Therefore, conclusions derived from our model  have to be viewed together 
with social, political and other economic factors. 
Recall our optimization problem in the last section: 
subject to: 
kp(T)  =  k 
kp (0)  =  kpO' 
(9) 
(11) 
In the last section, the terminal time Tis exogenously given. Now we hope to choose the 
privatization rate  as  well  as  the  terminal  time  T optimally.  This  modification does  not ON THE DYNAMICS OF PRIVATIZATION  229 
change the Euler condition for the optimal choice of privatization rate kp 
and we still have 
the first-order condition: 
But the boundary condition for the optimal terminal time  T  requires that, at time t = T, 
(18) 
which is the same as requiring that the optimal terminal time should be chosen such that the 
amount of investment in the private sector is zero at time t = T: 
(19) 
Given the initial and the terminal conditions (9) and (11), we can solve for the optimal 






po+ {  [  (k -k
p0)rl (e  -1 )] 
rT  rt 
-[  ( 9 





p0)rl(e  -1)] 
rT  rt 
-[(9
p
-9s)TI(e  -l)y]}e . 
(15) 
(16) 
With the optimal rate of privatization given by equation (16), the optimal terminal time 
in equation (19) can be determined by setting timet toT  in equation (16) and letting the 
whole expression equal zero: 
(20) 
Rearranging equation (20), we have: 
Proposition 6:  The optimal terminal time  T  is given implicitly in the following equa­
tion: 
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It is obvious that, for equation  (21) to hold, the  term, [(9p- 9s)(l - rT) + (k- kpO),.Zy], 
has to be positive: 
(22) 
Also, for equation  (20) to hold, it needs: 
(23) 
From now on, in our model, we will choose the proper unit for the capital stock and make 
condition  (23) satis fied. In passing, we note that we already used both inequality  (23) and 
its opposite in  Proposition  5 of the last section. There we took the terminal time as exoge­
nously given, but, here, the determination of the optimal terminal time is precisely our task. 
With the help of condition  (23), we can analyze the responses of optimal terminal time T 
with respect to various  parameters  in  our  model.  A  total  differentiation of  equation  (21) 
yields: 
rT 2  - rT  - 2 
-e  r  yd (k-kP0) -e  (k-kP0)r dy 
(24) 
Condition  (23) implies that the coefficient for dT on the left side of equation  (24) is neg­
ative. Therefore, 
Proposition 7:  The  larger  the  initial state  capital  stock, the  longer  the  optimal time 
span for the privatization process. 
This proposition can be easily shown  from equation  (24) (note  ks0 = (k- kp0) ): 
(25) 
In other words, if the initial private capital stock is  large, the optimal time for privatiza­
tion will be short; and vice versa: 
This proposition implies that, other things equal, the economy with a large state sector 
needs more time to privatize than the economy with a small state sector. From the consid­
eration of long-run income maximization, it also suggests that the exogenously determined 
time span, which we considered in  the last section, cannot achieve long-run income maxi­
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in our model. The adoption of the time span for privatization to country specifics is further 
required by the next proposition. 
Proposition 8:  Both a high privatization cost and a high income discount rate increase 
the optimal terminal time of privatization. 
This can be seen from equation (24): 
Thus  with  different  adjustment  costs  and  income  discount  rates,  different  economies 
should choose different time horizons of privatization. The adjustment cost not only slows 
down the pace of privatization directly as  we argued in the last section, it reinforces this 
effect indirectly through a longer time for privatization. The role of the income  discount 
rate  can be  interpreted  in  two  senses.  For  the  case  of  a  small  economy,  if we  take  the 
income discount rate  as  the  interest rate of the world  capital market,  then  a  high world 
interest rate will increase the time span for privatization. If we take the income discount 
rate as the subjective time discount rate,  then an economy with a high time preference will 
privatize longer than an economy with a low time preference. 
Proposition 9:  If (rn  >  (rn2 for 0 < t < T, the larger the efficiency difference between 
the private sector and  the state sector, the shorter the time span for privatization; if (rn 
< (rt)2 for 0 < t < T, the larger the efficiency difference, the longer the time span for priva­
tization. 
To show this proposition, note that, from equation (24), 
As shown in Proposition 1, the term [rTerT- erT  + 1] is positive or negative depending 
on whether (rn < (rt)2 
or (rn  >  (rt)2 for 0 < t < T. This proposition indicates that the effi­
ciency difference between the private and the state sectors can have two effects on the opti­
mal  terminal  time.  On  one  hand,  when  the  efficiency  difference  is  large,  income 
maximization demands rapid privatization in a short time span. But, on the other hand, fast 
privatization  incurs  more adjustment  cost. Hence the optimal terminal time will be deter­
mined by balancing the efficiency gain and adjustment loss at the margin. 
After we have qualitatively analyzed the effects of various parameters on the optimal ter­
minal timeT  in our model, we need to  go back to the  optimal  investment equation (16). 
Now since the terminal time is endogenously determined, some of our results obtained in 
the last section cannot apply here quantitatively. In particular, Propositions 1 to 3 should be 232  CHINA  ECONOMIC  REVIEW  VOLUME 5(2)  1994 
re-examined because all parameters in our model not only affect the optimal rate of invest­
ment or privatization directly, they also impact on the optimal terminal time T, which in 
turn influences the optimal rate of privatization in equation (16). As the preparations for 
these  re-examinations, we  note  that Proposition 4 still  holds  if we change the derivative 
dkP  (t)  dT  into  ()kP  (t)  ldT.  The reason for this is the same as before: more time avail­
able for the completion of the privatization process does not affect, or, at most, slows down, 
the rate of privatization; that is to say, 
(28) 
In the following, we can see that Propositions 1 to 3 can be extended qualitatively from 
the case of exogenous terminal time to the case of endogenous terminal time. We present 
them here without detailed arguments. 
First, with Proposition 7 and condition (28), we have 
Proposition 3':  The optimal rate of privatization is always increasing in the initial pro­
portion of the state capital stock. 
Second, Proposition 8 and condition (28) together give rise to: 
Proposition 2':  While the direct adjustment cost may increase or decrease the rate of 
privatization, it  always lengthens the optimal time span of  privatization,  which in tum 
slows down the privatization rate. 
Here akp  (t)  /()y has an ambiguous sign as sho�n in Proposition 2, but the second term 
on the right is always negative. Thus, in general, dkp  ( t) I  dy does not have a definite sign. 
Finally, with Proposition 8 and condition (28), 
Proposition 1':  The efficiency difference between the private sector and the public 
sector has an ambiguous effect on the rate of privatization. 
dkp(t)ld(fJ
p
-6s)  =  akp(t)ld(6
p
-es) + [dkp(t)/()T ]dT /d(fJ
p
-fJs), 
which has an ambiguous sign because both terms on the right side can be negative or pos­
itive. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have considered the time path of privatization and the optimal time span 
of privatization from the perspective of adjustment cost minimization or income maximi­
zation. We have found that: ON THE DYNAMICS OF PRIVATIZATION  233 
1.  the rate of privatization is negatively related to the amount of the initial private cap­
ital stock and positively related to the total existing capital stock. That is to say, the 
rate is  positively related to the existing state capital stock. In addition, the  optimal 
terminal time is positively related to  the existing state capital stock; 
2.  the  efficiency difference between the  private  sector  and state  sector  has ambiguous 
effects on the rate of privatization and the optimal terminal time of privatization; 
3.  the  adjustment  cost  may  speed  up  or  slow  down  the  rate  of  privatization  and,  it 
unambiguously increases the optimal terminal time of privatization; 
4.  the rate of privatization is time-dependent. For certain parameters of the initial state 
capital, efficiency difference, adjustment cost and the time discount rate, the rate of 
privatization can be accelerating and decelerating. 
We can take a more general approach to the dynamics of privatization instead of special­
izing our case to the linear technology and quadratic adjustment cost. As our results from 
the simple model have suggested, the complicated relations between the rate and time span 
of privatization  on  the  one  hand  and  various  parameters  on  the  other  can  be seen  most 
clearly through an explicit analytical solution to our problem. 
The adjustment in the labor market cannot be seen directly in our model. But we want to 
re-emphasize that it can be modeled if the capital stock is broadly defined as the combina­
tion of physical and human capital. In this way, the reallocation cost of labor force from the 
state sector to the private sector can be easily included into the adjustment cost of invest­
ment in our model. 
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